The Impact of Integration Strategies on Food Business Firm Value by Dorsey, Sarah & Boland, Michael A.
The Impact of Integration Strategies
on Food Business Firm Value
Sarah Dorsey and Michael Boland
The objective of this study is to analyze whether a discount or premium exists for coordi-
nation strategies in food processing, wholesale grocery, retail supermarkets, and restaurants.
Significant premiums are found for food processor and restaurant vertical integration or
diversification strategies. Significant discounts are found for food wholesaler and retail su-
permarket integration or diversification strategies. Food processors are found to be inte-
grating toward retail supermarkets during this time period.
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Analyzing integration strategies in the food
economy is an important research topic in the
field of industrial organization in agricultural
economics (Sexton, 2000). However, there has
been no research that has measured the impact
of these strategies on firm value. This study is
the first to measure the impact of these strate-
gieson firmvalue. The objectiveofthis studyis
to analyze whether a discount or premium ex-
ists for integration or diversification in food
processing, wholesale grocery, retail super-
markets, and restaurants. Individual corporate
segment data are used in this study. If the sum
of the imputed values of the individual seg-
ments of the firm is greater (less) than the ac-
tualvalue ofthefirm,additional (lacking)value
exists that may be attributable to an integration
or diversification premium (discount).
Literature Review
Vertical integration is defined as a method of
vertical marketing system synchronization in
which coordination of two or more stages occur
under common ownership via management
directive (Martinez, 1999). Horizontal integra-
tion is similar to vertical integration except that
it refers to firms pursuing activities that are in
the same stage in the marketing system. A re-
lated term is diversification meaning that firms
can pursue activities outside of their core busi-
nesses. For the purposes of this article, diver-
sification refers to activities outside of the food
economy. This is done to distinguish diversifi-
cation from vertical or horizontal integration in
the food economy.
For example, the beverage company, Pepsico,
acquired a group of restaurant chains including
Pizza Hut and Taco Bell in the 1980s. This was
considered horizontal integration because Pep-
sico sought to extend its managerial economies
ofscope across its distribution system. Theylater
divested these assets in the mid1990s. Sara Lee,
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owns the Hanes clothing line, which is consid-
ered diversification because it is a business not
related to its core food businesses. Each firm in
the data was carefully analyzed using its annual
10-K report to determine whether it was an in-
tegration strategy (Pepsico) or a diversification
strategy (Sara Lee).
Hennessy (1996) summarizes the integra-
tion literature in agricultural economics. He
suggests that firm structure, desire to reduce
variability in supply, and cost of testing for
quality are the three most common reasons
cited for integration in the food economy. A
firm using horizontal integration as a business
strategy may achieve economies of improved
processing technologies and marketing tech-
niques. Barkema, Drabenstott, and Welch
(1991) and Young and Hobbs (2002) suggest a
premium for being vertically aligned.
The literature has generally found a dis-
count from diversification for firms in the U.S.
economy (Berger and Ofek, 1995; Laeven and
Levine, 2005; Lang and Stulz, 1994; Servaes,
1996). Katchova (2005) found a discount from
diversification in farming operations but this
issue has not been tested for food firms beyond
the farm gate. One exception is Frank and
Henderson (1992) whose Table 1 shows the
extent of vertical integration in the food pro-
cessing sector in 1982. Furthermore, none of
these previous studies have analyzed the inte-
gration premium or discount.
Reasons Why Firms Integrate
Theliterature hasidentifiedthreebroadtheories
on why firms integrate. These are transactions
costs theory, agency theory, and contractual
incompleteness theory. A brief overview of
each theory is presented below. Boland,
Golden, and Tsoodle (2008) describe various
applications of each theory in the management
and agricultural economics literature.
Transactions costs was first articulated by
Coase (1937) who discussed integration and its
relationship to the definition of a firm, indicat-
ing the ‘‘supersession of the price mechanism’’
through vertical integration is a defining char-
acteristicofa firm. Firms can gettheinputsthey
need from other firms, through a contractual
arrangement or they can make them within their
own firm. But, as Coase (1937) discusses,
complete contract development and enforce-
ment are difficult. Because of this difficulty,
firms may be better off purchasing (e.g., inte-
grating) other firms that already produce the
inputs needed instead of contracting with them.
Agency theory explains why one party (the
principal) determines the work for which an-
other party (the agent) undertakes (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). An agent has an incentive to
shirk and the principal must structure the
transaction such that the agent does not shirk.
While this theory has been used to explain
contractual arrangements, in circumstances
where a principal cannot structure such a con-
tract, actual integration will occur.
Grossman and Hart (1986) discuss the
contractual incompleteness issue and how it is
applied to property rights, in particular. They
conclude that an integration strategy will be
pursued if one firm’s investment decision is
more important than that of the other firm and
nonintegration will be pursued if the invest-
ment decisions of both firms are less important.
The results are stated as follows:
‘‘If total and marginal benefits of investment
movetogether, firmiownership offirms iand
j will lead to overinvestment by firm i and
underinvestment by firm j. On the other hand,
nonintegration will lead to moderate invest-
ment levels by each firm. The optimal own-
ership structure will be chosen to minimize
the overall loss in surplus due to investment
distortions.’’ (p. 710)
Reasons Why Firms Diversify
Diversification is different from integration in
the sense that a firm integrates backward or
forward in the marketing channel in related
businessestoachieve lowercostsorcontrolover
the quality of an input whereas diversification is
a portfolio strategy that occurs outside of the
marketing channel. A detailed review of over
20 articles is presented in Dorsey (2006). With
regard to the agribusiness literature, Ding,
Caswell, and Zhou (1987) found a lack of
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measured by stock price and diversification.
Diversification reached its heyday in the 1960s
and 1970s when firms (e.g., conglomerates)
diversified as a means of developing a portfolio
of businesses that were not related with each
other.
Among agribusinesses, General Mills was
probably the most well known conglomerate
and in 1975, General Mills had diversified into
13 different divisions including Restaurants,
Toys,PackagedFoods,Chemicals,SnackFoods,
Travel Agency, Furniture, Fashion, Collecti-
bles, Direct Marketing, Cereals, and Mixes and
Flours (Taylor, Brester, and Boland, 2005).
Snack Foods, Cereals, and Mixes and Flours
would be considered horizontal integration.
Restaurants and these three divisions would be
considered vertical integration. Combinations
of the other businesses would be considered
diversification.
Measuring the Integration Discount
or Premium
Berger and Ofek’s (1995) model for measuring
the impact of diversification is modified to
measure thevertical or horizontal integration or
diversification discount or premium. The con-
ceptual model is the following:
Excess Value 5 f(firm effects, binary vari-
ables to measure integration or diversification)
Estimation of this model results in an esti-
mated Excess Value (EV) that is used to cal-
culate a discount or premium from integration
or diversification. To determine whether a
premium or discount exists for integration or
diversification, a method must be identified to
assign value to a firm and its business seg-
ments. Imputed firm value can be calculated by
computing values for each individual business
segment as reported by the firm to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
and comparing the sum of these values to the
actual value of the firm as a whole. If the sum
of the imputed values of the individual seg-
ments is greater (less) than the actual value of
the firm, additional (lacking) value exists that
may be attributable to an integration or diver-
sification premium (discount). The value
formula is defined as EV 5 ln (V / IV) where V
is the sum of the market value of equity and the
book value of debt and IV is the sum of the
imputed values for each individual business
segment. The following paragraphs explain, in
detail, how EV is calculated.
In each industry, there are firms who operate
in only one segment. A segment refers to a part
of a firm that operates under a different four-
digit U.S. Department of Commerce Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code from other
parts of the firm. A firm reports its financial
data to the SEC under a specific SIC code if its
sales, assets, or earnings before interest and
taxes (EBIT) are at least 10% of the firm total.
Therefore, if a firm operates in only one seg-
ment, it reports under only one four-digit SIC
code. The median ratio of total capital (market
value of common equity plus book value of














where Vij is total capital for firm i in segment j,
aij is total assets for firm i in segment j, n is the
number of firms in segment j, and m is the firm
with the median ratio.1 An imputed value for
each segment of each firm can then be defined,
using the ratio in Equation (1), as:




where IVij is the imputed value for segment j of
firm i and aij is assets for firm i in segment j.
1As in Berger and Ofek (1995) and other studies
using this value calculation method, the median ratio is
used instead of the mean ratio to account for skewness
in the data distributions. The median ratios are calcu-
lated using the narrowest SIC group that contains three
or more firms. For processing firms, 53% of the
median calculations use four digit SIC codes, 42%
use three digit SIC codes, and 5% use two digit SIC
codes. For wholesale firms, 42% of the median calcu-
lations use four digit SIC codes and 52% use three
digit SIC codes. The percentages for wholesale firms
do not sum to 100% because a small number of
medians in this sector had to be calculated using data
from only one firm. For retail and restaurant firms,
99% of the median calculations use four digit SIC
codes and 1% use three digit SIC codes.
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where IVi is the imputed value for firm i. So the
value, EV, of firm i is:




where Vi is total capital for firm i and IVi is the
sum of imputed values for each segment of the
firm. If Vi is greater (less) than IVi then value is
positive (negative) and the value of the firm is
greater (less) than the sum of the imputed value
of its segments. Equations (1) to (4) are also
calculated using sales in place of assets. Be-
cause assets and sales for each firm are multi-
plied by the median ratio of total capital to
assets, these two accounting items are referred
to as ‘‘multipliers’’.
Unallocated assets may be a problem when
making the value calculations described above.
Therefore, consistent with Berger and Ofek
(1995),ifthe sumofsegmentassetsdiffersfrom
the sum of the firm’s assets by more than 75%
then the firm is excluded from the analysis that
uses the asset multiplier. If the difference is
within 75%, the value is adjusted up or down by
the percentage difference between the sum of
the segment assets and the total firm assets. The
sales multiplier is adjusted in a similar manner.
After all firm calculations are complete, outliers
areremovedforeach ofthe twovalue measures.
Outliers are defined as those values that are
three standard deviations above or below the
mean for each of the multipliers. Six percent of
the observations were deleted as outliers.
Description of the Exogenous Model for
Explaining Integration or Diversification
The value measure shown in Equation (4) is
used in the following model to further analyze
the effect of integration or diversification on
firm value, where these are exogenously deter-
mined. This means that the model shows how
certain firm effects influencevalue,butnothow
these characteristics influence the integration
or diversification decision. Schumacher and
Boland (2005) show howthe food economy can
be characterized into food processing, whole-
sale grocery, retail supermarkets, and restau-
rants. The mathematical representation of the
conceptual model is estimated for these four
sectors separately and is defined as:
(5) EVi,t 5 a 1 bDi,t 1 gXi,t 1 ei,t
where EVi,t is the value of firm i in year t and
Di,t is a matrix of binary variables equal to one
if firm i in year t is integrated according to the
definitionsgiveninTable 1 and 0 otherwise.Xi,t
is a vector of firm effects for firm i in year t,
including the ratio of capital expenditures to
sales, net margin, leverage, firm control, and
assets. These effects differ by firm due to
managerial strategies employed by thefirm. All
variables in Equation (5) including the vari-
ables in the Xi,t vector are defined in Table 1. The
parameters to be estimated are a, b, and g and
e is the error term.
Description of the Independent Variables
The ratio of capital expenditures to sales, net
margin, and assets has been widely used in
previous literature as firm effect variables for
explaining the value of a firm. These are the
only firm effects’ variables available for seg-
ment level data. The ratio of capital expendi-
tures to sales is an indication of firm growth
because it shows the change in capital spending
as sales increase. Net margin is the ratio of
EBIT to sales and is a measure of firm profit-
ability. The natural log of total assets is used
as a measure of firm size. Increased growth,
profitability, and size are expected to have a
positive effect on the value of a firm. A qua-
dratic size term is also added because the effect
of size on value may be nonlinear due to de-
creasing marginal returns.
Equation (5) also includes variables for le-
verage and control. Leverage in this study is
measured by the debt to asset ratio for each
firm and is included because excessive leverage
is generally thought to have a negative effect on
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sons why some leverage is desirable. The fi-
nance literature has consistently found a neg-
ative effect for leverage. Boyd et al. (2007)
provide a literature review of management as a
firm effect variable in explaining profitability
and found that, due to data limitations, it was
not possible to use such a variable when em-
ploying firm-level data as opposed to farm-
level data. A variable for management is not
included but is considered part of any unex-
plained variation in the model.
The variable to indicate control is included
due to the finding by Anderson and Reeb
(2003) that family-controlled firms are more
profitable than nonfamily controlled firms. The
variable for control is binary and equals one if
the founding family is the largest equity holder
and 0 otherwise. Family control is a firm effect
variable. Family firms were identified using
corporate histories from Hoovers, The Corpo-
rate Library, individual company records in-
cluding SEC documents, and data from
Anderson and Reeb.
Thebinary variables(Di,t) defined inTable1
and used in Equation (5) were initially assigned
into 23 different, nonoverlapping categories
based on the diversification and/or integration
strategy the firms were pursuing in a particular
year. Annual 10-K reports for food economy
firms obtained from the SEC and compiled by
Standard and Poor’s Compustat were used to
determine whether an individual firm was di-
versified or integrated within its segments in
each year. Then, a determination was made as
to whether the strategy being pursued by each
firm was integration or diversification. Due to
a small number of firms in some of the cate-
gories, the variables were aggregated into the
nine binary variables shown in Table 1. Notice
Table 1. Variable Definitions
Symbol Variable Definition
EVi,t Value Value of the firm
X1,i,t Ln(Assets) Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t
X2,i,t Profitability EBIT divided by sales for firm i in year t
X3,i,t Growth Capital expenditures divided by sales for firm i in year t
X4,i,t Leverage Debt to asset ratio for firm i in year t
X5,i,t Ln(Assets)2 Natural log of total assets squared for firm i in year t
X6,i,t Family control Binary variable that equals one if firm i is family-controlled in year t
and 0 otherwise
D1,i,t VI-Processing Binary variable that equals one if firm i is Vertically Integrated into
processing in year t and 0 otherwise
D2,i,t VI-Wholesale Binary variable that equals one if firm i is Vertically Integrated into
wholesale in year t and 0 otherwise
D3,i,t VI-Retail Binary variable that equals one if firm i is Vertically Integrated into retail
in year t and 0 otherwise restaurants
D4,i,t VI-Restaurant Binary variable that equals one if firm i is Vertically Integrated into in year
t and 0 otherwise
D5,i,t Diversification Binary variable that equals one if firm i is diversified into unrelated
activities in year t and 0 otherwise
D6,i,t Horizontal
integration
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is horizontally integrated
in year t and 0 otherwise
D7,i,t Diversification-HI Binary variable that equals one if firm i is diversified into unrelated
activities and horizontally integrated in year t and 0 otherwise
D8,i,t Single segment
firms
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is a single segment firm in year
t and 0 otherwise
D9,i,t VI-Productiona Binary variable that equals one if firm i is Vertically Integrated into
production in year t and 0 otherwise
a This variable only applies to processing firms.
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b e c a u s et h e r ea r en of i r m si nt h ed a t ai n
the other sectors that are integrated into
production.
The model was estimated in the following
form for each of the four food economy sectors
using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR):
(6)
EVi,t 5 a 1 b1D1,i,t 1 b2D2,i,t 1 b3D3,i,t
1 b4D4,i,t 1 b5D5,i,t 1 b6D6,i,t
1 b7D7,i,t 1 b9D9,i,t 1 g1X1,i,t
1 g2X2,i,t 1 g3X3,i,t 1 g4X4,i,t
1 g5X5,i,t 1 g6X6,i,t 1 ei,t
where a, b, and g are parameters to be esti-
mated and e is the error term. D8,i,t is used as
the default variable for the diversification and
integration dummy variables. The SUR meth-
odology is used to account for any correlation
that may exist among the error terms in the
regression equations for the four food economy
firm sectors.
Description of the Endogenous Model for
Explaining Integration or Diversification
As discussed by Campa and Kedia (2002) and
Laeven and Levine (2007), certain firm and
industry effects may lead a firm to diversify
[or integrate] and affect firm value. In other
words, as stated by Campa and Kedia (2002),
‘‘firms that choose to diversify [or integrate]
are not a random sample of firms’’ (p. 1747).
In this case, Di,t and ei,t in Equation (5) might
be correlated. This would incorrectly attribute
a discount or premium to the diversification or
integration itself and not the underlying firm
characteristics that caused the firm to pursue
such a strategy. To account for these under-
lying firm and industry characteristics, diver-
sification and integration are endogenous.
Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure is
used to control for the self-selection of firms
that diversify.
Both the first and second stagesofHeckman’s
(1979) two step procedure are estimated using
each binary variable for each food economy
sector separately. For example, in one case,
the binary variable that indicates vertical
integration into processing (D1,i,t) for restaurant
firms is used as the dependent variable in the
first stage probit model and the lambdas cal-
culated from these results in the second stage.
Firm effects can be thought of as measuring
the effect of implementation or execution. For
example, a well executed strategy leads to in-
creased margins, which results in a firm being
profitable and able to retain earnings forgrowth
and the purchase of new assets or replacement
of existing assets with more productive assets.
Similarly, a capital structurewith greater equity
leads to an improved leverage ratio. The cor-
relation of firm effects with the decision to
diversify or integrate is analogous to a firm’s
ability to have better management talent to
implement the diversification or integration
plan. All of these would lead to a premium for
integration or diversification.
Description of the Data
The data used in this study are taken from
Standard and Poor’s Compustat database and
include data from 416 food business firms to-
taling 4,079 observations for 1983–2005. To be
used in the study, a firm had to report under SIC
codes for one or more of the following sectors:
food processing, food wholesale, food retail, or
restaurants. The 416 firms have one to four
segments of data and the combinations of each
by year sum to 4,079 observations. The data are
unique in that they include financial informa-
tion for the individual business segments as
well as the firm as a whole. Table 2 provides
means, medians, and standard deviations for
the independent variables in Equation (5) as
well as the number of segments. Table 3 shows
the median and mean values broken out by
multiplier, sector of the food economy, and
diversification status as well as the number of
observations in each subset.
The single segment median values for pro-
cessing firms is zero as is expected because it is
the log of a value that should be equal to one for
single segment firms. The median value for
multisegment processing firms is 20.7076
usingtheassetmultiplierand20.6675usingthe
sales multiplier. The meanvalues for processing
firms are 20.5864 using the asset multiplier and


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dorsey and Boland: Impact of Integration Strategies 59120.5705 using the sales multiplier. Table 3
suggests that integration or diversification de-
creases value most noticeably in the wholesale
sector and least in the processing sector. How-
ever, these are only preliminary indications of
the effect of integration and diversification on
firm value.
Results
The first section discusses the results from the
exogenous model and the second section dis-
cusses the results from the endogenous model.
Exogenous Integration and Diversification Model
Results
Exogeneity assumes that the independent bi-
nary variables for integration are not influenced
by the other independent variables. This sug-
gests, for example, that positive coefficients on
the binary variables in the model lead to in-
creases in value. The coefficients from the
estimation of the model with exogenous inte-
gration are shown in Table 4 along with the
weighted R
2 for the system of equations. Stan-
dard errors are in parentheses. The weighted
R
2 values are 0.3889 and 0.4477 for the asset
and sales multipliers, respectively.
In every sector except the wholesale sector,
the coefficient on log of assets (X1,i,t) is nega-
tively and significantly related to value and the
coefficient on log of assets squared (X5,i,t)i s
positive and significant in all but one case
(excluding wholesale). But the two coefficients
must be considered jointly to determine the
total effect of log of assets on the dependent
variable. Forexample, a one unit increase in the
log of assets increases value by 0.0041% for
food processing firms using the asset multi-
plier.2 This indicates that asset size has a posi-
tive effect on firm value, which is expected.
Table 3. Mean and Median Values and Number of Observations for Each Type of Food Economy Firm
Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurant
Median
Asset Multiplier
Single-segment firms 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Multisegment firms 20.7076 21.0192 20.6525 20.6426
Sales Multiplier
Single-segment firms 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Multisegment firms 20.6675 21.4285 20.7750 20.5889
Mean
Asset Multiplier
Single-segment firms 0.0429 20.0095 0.0795 0.0578
Multisegment firms 20.5864 20.8581 20.6815 20.6506
Sales Multiplier
Single-segment firms 0.0158 20.2018 20.0640 0.0381
Multisegment firms 20.5705 21.2665 20.8737 20.5986
Number of Observationsa
Single-segment firms 1,481 134 400 1,313
Multisegment firms 474 113 71 93
a The data set contains 4,079 total observations.
2Note that, when taking the derivative, the inter-
pretation is in terms of V/IV and not ln(V/IV). For
example, since the mean of the natural log of assets is
19.5124 (weighted mean of this variable for both
single segment and multi-segment firms) for firms in
the processing sector the total effect of the natural log




5g1 1 2g5lnðAssetsÞ5 0.0193
12*0.0006*19:512450.0041.

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Dorsey and Boland: Impact of Integration Strategies 593With the exception of the wholesale sector
(asset and sales multiplier), the coefficients on
the variables for profitability (X2,i,t) and growth
(X3,i,t) are positively related to firm value,
which is expected. For example, for a one unit
increase in EBIT over sales (X2,i,t), value using
the sales multiplier increases by 0.0416% for
restaurant firms.3 A one unit increase in capital
expenditures over sales (X3,i,t) increases value
by 0.0185% for processing firms when the asset
multiplier is used. The parameter estimate for
X3,i,t (0.3048 from Table 4) is multiplied by the
weighted mean of this variable (0.0607) to get
0.0185. Capital expenditures over sales (X3,i,t)
include new assets, which would presumably
increase profitability and lead to an increase in
firm value. An increase in EBIT over sales
(X2,i,t) is indicative of an increase in profit-
ability, which would lead to an increase in firm
value. Campa and Kedia (2002) and Berger and
Ofek (1995) also found positive and significant
coefficients for EBIT over sales (X2,i,t) and
capital expenditures over sales (X3,i,t).
The coefficient on debt to asset ratio (X4,i,t)
is positive and significant for both the restau-
rant and wholesale sectors when the asset
multiplier is used. The coefficient on debt to
asset ratio (X4,i,t) is negative and significant in
the retail sector. For example, a one unit in-
crease in the debt to asset ratio increases value
using the sales multiplier by 0.0427% for res-
taurant firms. The parameter estimate for X5,i,t
(0.1338 from Table 4) is multiplied by the
weighted mean of this variable (0.319) to get
0.0427. Leverage is usually thought to have a
negative effect on firm value but large restau-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3Because the dependent variable is logged, the
coefficients must be multiplied by the mean value for
interpretation. For example, since the mean of EBIT
over sales for firms in the restaurant sector for the sales
multiplier is 0.0388 (weighted mean of this variable
for both single segment and multi-segment firms), the
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that are needed may not be valued lower be-
cause they are highly leveraged.
Notice that X6,i,t, the variable for family con-
trol, is positive and significant in every equation,
which supports the finding by Anderson and
Reeb (2003) that family control increases firm
value. As discussed by Halvorsen and Palmquist
(1980) and Kennedy (1981), adjustment is nec-
essary when interpreting dummy variables in
equations with logged dependent variables. The
third values for X6,i,t in Table 4 show the adjusted
coefficients for X6,i,t for each sector and multi-
plier. Table 4 indicates that a firm being family-
controlled increases value using the asset multi-
plier by 23.69% for processing firms.
Calculation of the Premium or Discount
Because the dummy variable for single segment
firms is used as the default variable in the SUR
estimation, all of the interpretations are in rela-
tion to this variable. Therefore, in Table 5, the
regression coefficients are used to find a dis-
count or premium using the mean value for
single segment firms in each of the sectors and
for each of the multipliers. The shaded discounts
and premiums are calculated from regression
coefficients that are significant at the 10% level.
The regression coefficients are the increases or
decreases in value relative to the mean value for
single segment firms. So, to find the actual dis-
count or premium, the regression coefficient is
multiplied by the mean for single segment firms
and this value is added to the mean. For exam-
ple,forprocessingfirms,the0.06%premiumfor
vertical integration into wholesale (D2,i,t)u s i n g
the sales multiplier is calculated as follows:
0.0158 1 (0.0158*(20.9645)) 5 0.00056*100
5 0.06% where 0.0158 is the mean value for
single segment processing firms using the sales
multiplier and 20.9645 is the regression coef-
ficient on (D2,i,t)f r o mT a b l e4 .
In the model using the asset multiplier, ver-
tical integration into thewholesale sector (D2,i,t)
results in a 0.73% premium for processing firms
(Table 5). This indicates that processing firms
that are integrated into the wholesale sector are
valued higher than single segment processing
firms, holding all other variables constant. The
same is true for every binary variable in every
case in the processing sector where the largest
premium is for diversification (D5,i,t) using both
multipliers and the smallest premiums are for
Table 5. Calculated Premiums and Discounts from Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results


















Mean 4.29% 1.58% 20.95% 220.18% 7.95% 26.40% 5.78% 3.81%
VI-Processing n/aa n/a 0.06%b 7.41% 2.13% 20.62% 2.41% 1.56%
VI-Wholesale 0.73%c 0.06% n/a n/a 21.27% 1.45% 0.37% 0.80%
VI-Retail 3.39% 1.45% 20.08% 2.33% n/a n/a n/a n/a
VI-Restaurant 1.04% 0.44% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Diversification 4.00% 1.48% 20.64% 218.83% 3.74% 23.16% 2.43% 2.04%
HI 0.84% 0.40% 20.60% 24.93% 3.08% 23.08% n/a n/a
Diversification-
HI 0.05% 0.09% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
VI-Production 2.35% 0.39% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
a n/a denotes not applicable.
b The regression coefficients from Table 4 are multiplied by the mean for single segment firms and this value is added to the
mean to find the actual discount or premium in every case. For example, for processing firms, the 0.06% premium for vertical
integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) using the sales multiplier is calculated as follows: 0.0158 1 (0.0158*20.9645) 5
0.00056*100 5 0.06% where 0.0158 is the mean value for single segment processing firms using the sales multiplier and
20.9645 is the regression coefficient on (D2,i,t) from Table 4.
c Shadedcells indicatethat the discountor premiumis calculatedfrom a regressioncoefficient that is significant at the10% level.
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sued jointly (D7,i,t).
Overall, the results from the models with
exogenous integration and the diversification
variables indicate that, in most cases, diversi-
fied and integrated firms are valued at a pre-
mium relative to single segment firms, with
variation between sectors and multipliers used.
To further investigate the effects, it is important
to determine if integration decisions should be
considered endogenous instead of exogenous
(i.e., the integration decisions may not be in-
dependent of the firm effects).
Endogenous Integration and Diversification
Model Results
Table 6 summarizes the endogeneity tests from
each of the models. If a cell contains n/a, the
variable did not occur in that particular model.
If the cell is empty, lambda is not significantly
different from zero in that model. The cells
with positive and negative signs indicate the
signs of the significant lambdas. The individual
lambdas are reported in Dorsey (2006) for each
combination.
If lambda is significant in the second stage
of Heckman’s two step procedure, this indi-
cates that the specific integration strategy that
is in the model is endogenous. This means
that it is correlated with the firm characteristics
that influence value. If lambda is negative
(positive) this correlation is negative (positive)
and coefficients on the binary variables in the
SUR results are biased downward (upward).
The strongest endogeneity indications are
given by those cases in which the signs using
the assets and salesmultipliers are the same and
the lambdas are both significant (i.e., dark
shaded cells). The same can be said for the
cases in which the lambdas for both the asset
and sales multiplier are insignificant, indicating
the binary diversification or integration deci-
sion is exogenously determined (i.e., lighter
shaded cells). When lambda is negative and
significant, the firm characteristics that cause
firms to diversify or integrate are negatively
correlated with firm value and the discount
turns to a premium. When lambda is positive
and significant, the firm characteristics that
cause firms to diversify or integrate are posi-
tively correlated with firm value and the pre-
mium turns to a discount.
There is one case where, using both multi-
pliers, the lambdas are negative and significant
and the discounts from the exogenous results
become premiums. This is the case of wholesale
firms that are pursuing horizontal integration.
Table 6. Summary of the Results of the Endogeneity Tests

















VI-Processing n/aa n/a 1 ——
VI-Wholesale 1b 1c n/a n/a 11
VI-Retail d 1 n/a n/a n/a n/a
VI-Restaurant 2b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
Diversification — — — — 11
HI — — n/a n/a n/a n/a
Diversification-
HI
— n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
VI-Production — — 1
VI-Processing — n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
a n/a denotes not applicable.
b A positive or negative sign indicates the sign of the coefficient on lambda in the second stage of Heckman’s two-step
procedure.
c The darker shaded cells denote the cases in which the signs on lambda using the assets and sales multipliers are the same and
the lambdas are both significant.
d The lighter shaded cells denote the cases in which the lambdas for both the asset and sales multiplier are insignificant.
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integration strategy leads to a premium, on av-
erage. Ingles Markets is an example of a firm
with this strategy whereby they began supplying
food to restaurants as well as retail supermar-
kets. Thus, the firm effects such as growth,
profitability, and size are correlated with their
decision to integrate or diversify.
Table 6 shows three cases in which charac-
teristics that cause firms to diversify or inte-
grate are positively correlated with firm value
and the premiums from the exogenous results
turn to discounts using both multipliers. The
results suggest that, on average, this decision
may lead to a discount in this situation for this
time period. Vertical integration into wholesale
by restaurant firms is one case where lambda is
positive. For example, Ruby Tuesday is a res-
taurant firm that was vertically integrated into
grocery wholesaling in the 1980s but divested
itself of its wholesaling operations by the end
of the 1990s. Vertical integration into whole-
sale by processing firms is another example.
For example, Con Agra Foods integrated into
wholesaling operations but later divested these
operations. Another case is diversification by
restaurant firms where Frisch’s (owners of
Golden Corral Restaurants) Restaurants diver-
sified into hotels and later sold this operation.
These examples suggest that management may
have realized this type of activity was having a
negative effect on firm value. In other words,
the firm effect variables such as growth, prof-
itability, and size for these three firms are
correlated with the decision to divest the inte-
grated or diversified operation. The results
suggest that this type of activity is causing a
discount during this time period, on average.
Conclusions and Implications
This is the first research to quantify the pre-
mium or discount from integration and diver-
sification strategies pursued by agribusiness
and food business firms. In general, integration
strategies used by processing firms had a pre-
mium associated with integration. This corre-
sponds with the increase in integration ob-
served in production agriculture. However,
efforts by wholesalers to integrate into
restaurants and processing have led to dis-
counts. The role of contracting between pro-
ducers and processors is increasing in agricul-
ture. It is evident from this research that
processors are also seeking to integrate further
towards retail supermarkets.
The managerial implications from this study
include the fact that larger firms, as measured
by asset size, have premiums which may be due
to lower fixed costs due to economies of scale,
lower variable costs due to economies of size,
or better negotiating ability. Diversification
outside of the food economy does not lead to
premiums while integration within the food
economy does lead to premiums in certain sit-
uations. Managers who seek to diversify should
analyze this strategy carefully.
Future research might seek to incorporate
this form of vertical coordination into a frame-
work for empirical research. Sykuta and James
(2004) indicate that the Contracting and Orga-
nizations Research Institute at the University of
Missouri has over 11,000 contract documents.
The food business and agribusiness contracts
could be matched with the firms used in this
research to include this form of vertical coordi-
nation. Future research using case studies, with
the unit of analysis being the firm pursuing the
different types of integration or diversification
strategies found here, could help researchers
better understand the motivation for the types of
strategies identified by Hennessy (1996) and
quantify them into the three theories on vertical
coordination.
Most research has focused on the interface
between producers and processors in the mar-
keting system. The food economy is a large
component of the U.S. economy and a better
understanding of trends in coordination be-
tween these participants beyond the farm gate
can help better explain why coordination is
increasing at the interface between producers
and processors. Food processors are closest to
the producer and it may be that these premiums
from integration towards retail supermarkets in
the food economy are causing processors to
consider similar coordination strategies for
production agriculture.
[Received August 2008; Accepted March 2009.]
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